AN “ASIAN CENTURY”?

The “Asian Century”, we gather, is a projected 21st-century era defined by Asia’s global pre-eminence in economics, politics, and culture. Driven by the rapid growth of nations like China and India, this shift parallels the characterisation of the 19th century as Britain’s era and the 20th century as the “American Century”.

Who would have thought that at the quarter of its passage, Asia, West Asia actually, will be the theatre of a war that could prove catastrophic for the whole world?

Concerns rise as the war in the Gulf threatens to witness Phase-2 of “Operation Epic Fury”. And that could include destruction of the oil, the very nature-blessed commodity for which the violence is being perpetrated. And, God forbid, attacks on nuclear facilities and drinkable water reserves.

Indeed, Asia is also where much of the diplomatic sabre-rattling is on. Pakistan is working to facilitate talks to end the conflict. And India has hosted BRICS talks and is preparing for the QUAD later this year.

Alongside, a badly bruised India, despite two “great friends” leading, is struggling to repair its relations with the United States.

As the New York Times reports, on a high-profile visit,​ Secretary of State Marco Rubio has a “gargantuan task”: “defuse tensions over President Trump’s anti-India aggression and overtures to China.” True, but that is only a part of the problem. India also closely monitored the ‘double’ Summit in Beijing.

Here is my take………

This is the tale of two summits in Beijing. They establish China as the new superpower, diplomacy-wise, if not economically or militarily. The one with US President Donald Trump has hastened it; Vladimir Putin’s visit has consolidated it.

Xi Jinping, the common host, fended off many hopeful demands from Trump, especially China leaning on an unyielding Iran, and held another with Putin within four. That was very clever.

He now sees China as the mediator and hopes to play peacemaker, the role Trump has sought for the US, with limited success. The Nobel can wait.

With China’s close relations with Russia, although a junior partner now, the Trump-led US must face this combine, for now. This complicates his plans to get Putin to end the Ukraine conflict.

A Xi-Putin joint statement advised that “there is a danger of fragmentation of the international community and a return to the ‘law of the jungle’. “Attempts by several states to unilaterally manage global affairs, impose their interests on the entire world, and limit the sovereign development of other countries, in the spirit of the colonial era, have failed,” the statement added.

The war in Iran has given a powerful impetus to strengthening Russo-Chinese ties. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has made China critically reliant on Russian oil and gas supplies and thus helped Moscow fill up its coffers and get additional funds for its ongoing war on Ukraine.

This may eclipse the much-trumpeted Trump visit. Yet the best thing that can be said about it is that it helped to lower the temperature in US-China relations at least temporarily.

This augurs well for economies across the world, the markets and global supply chains hit by the Gulf war. They could expect some relief. But Trump’s renewed threats on return from Beijing, warning Iran that “the clock is ticking”, raise doubts. The talks have slipped into limbo.

Although China is badly hit by it, Xi sagely told Trump, who may have listened in silence, that the conflict was, in the first place, unnecessary. Xi avoided being drawn fully into US positions on Iran or Russia. He signalled that Beijing intends to maintain strategic autonomy and its Moscow partnership. The Iran war has reshaped global power dynamics.

After the Xi-Trump summit, both sides claimed success — but the balance of strategic advantage seems to tilt more toward China in the short term, while the United States secured some tactical economic gains.

Trump arrived for a high-stakes summit accompanied by several CEOs: a high-profile business delegation spanning agriculture, aviation, electric vehicles and artificial intelligence (AI) chips. Xi met them. Trade was near the top of the agenda. But the US couldn’t awe China.

Although Beijing did not formally announce it, Trump scored on business deals and investment promises, like commitments to buy 200 Boeing aircraft (a larger figure had been speculated earlier), promises of increased US agricultural imports, restoration of US beef access, and a new trade/investment dialogue mechanism. These are politically useful for Trump domestically, especially in manufacturing and farm states.

Xi achieved perhaps his biggest objective: projecting China as a stable, confident global power while the US appeared distracted by wars and domestic political pressures. The elaborate state welcome, symbolism, and tone of the summit reinforced Xi’s image as an equal — or even steadier — counterpart to Trump.

But despite his use of flattery on Xi, and despite a warm and grand welcome Xi accorded to him, Trump could not breach the resolute China Wall on key geopolitical issues like the Iran War and Taiwan. The American concept of “strategic competition” stands countered by China’s “constructive strategic stability” for US-China bilateral ties.

Several analysts have described the summit as a “stabilisation exercise” on China’s terms. Xi avoided public confrontation, conceded little, and still emerged looking statesmanlike.

That semantic change matters to Beijing because it signals acceptance of China as a permanent peer competitor rather than merely a challenger.

China did not significantly loosen controls over rare-earth exports, despite US pressure. These minerals are crucial for advanced manufacturing and defence industries.

China firmly reiterated that Taiwan remains its “red line.” Trump did not clearly commit to moving ahead with the proposed large Taiwan arms package, which Beijing will interpret as at least partial success. For Beijing, even creating ambiguity in US commitments toward Taiwan is strategically valuable.

Taipei may be the most nervous observer after the summit. Trump’s ambiguity on arms sales and his transactional approach increase concerns in Taiwan that it could become part of a broader US-China bargain.

How would America’s allies neighbouring China take the summit’s outcome? Japan, South Korea, and some Southeast Asian states may worry about a possible US-China accommodation, which could sideline their concerns. This is especially true regarding Taiwan and maritime security in the Pacific region.

The larger geopolitical picture shows that the summit did not resolve the structural rivalry between the US and China. Instead, it temporarily managed it. The deeper conflicts remain. They include technology dominance, AI and semiconductors, Taiwan, maritime control, trade imbalances and competing global influence.

What changed was tone, not fundamentals. As The Guardian newspaper said, the Xi-Trump meeting produced “warm optics but limited substance.” By contrast, Xi meeting Putin bolstered the two.