Right-Sizing the Parliament

India’s delimitation debate needs bigger ideas, not just bigger numbers

A stitch in time saves (ninety) nine! But when time stretches to five decades, the cloth is on the verge of becoming a shred.

The 50-year freeze on the delimitation of parliamentary constituencies — initiated during the Emergency in 1976 for an initial 25-year period — has now snowballed into an acrimonious debate between the South and the North. As scholar Ravi K Mishra’s recent book Demography, Representation and Delimitation shows, the current discourse is riddled with factoids overshadowing facts.

Multiple issues — ranging from intra-state equity and parity among Lok Sabha MPs to the Finance Commission’s population-based fund devolution — have been collapsed into one, posing a serious challenge to building consensus on this contentious issue.

The provisions of Articles 81 & 82

But first, let’s understand what delimitation means. It literally refers to the act or process of fixing limits or boundaries of territorial constituencies in a country or province with a legislative body. In India, this task is entrusted to a high-powered body called the Delimitation Commission (or Boundary Commission), whose orders have the force of law and cannot be challenged in any court.

Such commissions have been constituted four times: in 1952 (under the Delimitation Commission Act, 1952), in 1963 (under the 1962 Act), in 1973 (under the 1972 Act), and in 2002 (under the 2002 Act). It is in this context that we must understand Articles 81 and 82 of the Constitution, as amended from time to time.

Article 81 deals with the composition of the Lok Sabha, while Article 82 mandates that the number of seats must be (re)adjusted after every census. It also requires that boundaries be redefined. At the Constitution’s commencement, the upper limit for Lok Sabha membership was 500, and 494 MPs were elected, each representing approximately 7.5 lakh people. Of course, there were variations — the number of electors and the size of a constituency are shaped by a complex interplay of demography, geography, and history. A decade later, with population growth and state reorganisation following the State Reorganisation Commission’s recommendations, this was raised to 525 in 1963. In 1973, the strength of the Lok Sabha increased to 542. States like Karnataka and Kerala gained an additional MP, while Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra each gained three.

As it stands today, Article 81(2) caps the Lok Sabha at 550 members — 530 from 28 states and 20 from the eight Union Territories. Clause 81(2)(a) stipulates that the ratio between population and seats should be, as far as practicable, uniform across states. Clause 81(2)(b) further requires that each state be divided into territorial constituencies such that the ratio between the population of each constituency and the number of seats allotted is roughly equal throughout the state.

Up until 1976, after every decadal census, seats in the Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, and state legislative assemblies were reallocated to maintain (nearly) equal population representation. However, during the Emergency, the 42nd Amendment froze the number of seats in both Parliament and state assemblies until the 2001 Census. The lead proponent of this freeze, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, justified it by pointing to uneven progress in family planning across states. The assumption was that, within two decades, states across India would achieve similar total fertility rates (TFRs).

However, contrary to global trends, India showed an economic-demographic paradox. Typically, economically productive regions experience high population growth due to migration. But in India’s first wave of interstate migration, it was largely men who moved out in search of work in manufacturing and construction, while women stayed back to manage agriculture. Over time, however, entire families have begun migrating to urban centres, often beyond state boundaries. Whether this anecdotal trend holds true will only be verifiable after the next Census.

In 2001, while constituency boundaries were redrawn to balance populations, the number of Lok Sabha and legislative assembly seats per state remained unchanged. This was due to the 84th Constitutional Amendment, which extended the freeze until 2026. This time, there were voices of protest. Former Speakers Shivraj Patil and Somnath Chatterjee warned that such a freeze was creating gross representational inequities — some MPs were being elected by fewer than half a million voters, while others represented constituencies of over three million. Seen from this perspective, it was the North that did not give proportional political heft to its electors.

Delimitation in India: United South

Nonetheless, the entire southern political class — across party lines — has positioned the impending delimitation exercise as a threat to India’s federal structure. Their arguments cut across ideologies. Congress’ Shashi Tharoor, for instance, argues: “While there is some logic to the argument that a democracy must value all its citizens equally — whether they live in a progressive state or one that, by failing to empower its women and reducing total fertility, has allowed its population to shoot through the roof — no federal democracy can survive the perception that states would lose political clout if they develop well, while others would gain more seats in Parliament as a reward for failure.” He is clearly referring to states like Kerala and Bihar.

This view is not different from what Chandrababu Naidu of TDP, MK Stalin of DMK, or MA Baby of CPI(M) have voiced. In fact, the chief ministers of Andhra Pradesh (Naidu) and Tamil Nadu (Stalin) have even made tongue-in-cheek appeals for their voters to have more children to reap future demographic dividends. Former Cabinet Secretary KM Chandrasekhar has also warned that “[a]ll the South Indian states will stand to lose their political influence in comparison with the North.” Former Justice of the Supreme Court Justice KM Joseph has gone further: “When that [delimitation] happens, states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu are going to lose the number of constituencies that they have and states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, where the population is not controlled, will have more constituencies. What will be the state of federalism in India? What will happen to the concept of Union of India as was contemplated?”

Writing in Foreign Affairs, historian Ramachandra Guha too reflects on the “strains placed on Indian federalism [which] may boil over in 2026”. “Then, what is now merely a divergence between north and south might become an actual divide,” he argued.

Yes, the strains are real — but given the Indian polity’s record in resolving issues as complex as linguistic reorganisation and development demands, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic. Eventually, from aspiration and assertion, some form of adjustment is likely. Both the BJP-led NDA and the Congress-led UPA have coalition partners across the country, contest state elections with vigour, and are eager to leave their imprint on governance at every level — from zilla panchayats to municipal corporations.

The counterfactual

It is important to ask a counterfactual: what if Article 82 had operated as originally intended by the founding members of the Constitution? The changes in seat allocation would have been gradual, and perhaps less contentious. To compensate for reduced Lok Sabha representation, alternative mechanisms could have been introduced — such as revised fund devolution formulas or a stronger Inter-State Council to address concerns. Instead, the long freeze has now created a political time bomb that India’s democracy must defuse with care, consensus, and constitutional foresight.

As has been pointed out, the five southern states — Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Telangana, and Tamil Nadu — fear that after the 2026 delimitation, the ‘Hindi heartland’ will enjoy even greater representation in the Lok Sabha, further diluting their political clout.

These states account for 20 per cent of India’s population, generate 30 per cent of its GDP, contribute 26 per cent to the central tax pool, but receive only 16 per cent of the funds allocated by the Finance Commission.

The counter-argument is that these states are currently over-represented in Parliament. Contrary to the principle of “one person, one vote,” the average constituency size in the South is only about 60 per cent of that in the North. Raising concerns is easier than finding acceptable solutions, but here is a listing of some of the options that have been discussed by scholars, media persons, and political commentators over the last few months.

Home Minister’s assurance

A boundary condition has been set by Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s assurance that “under no circumstances will any state lose a parliamentary seat” in the new configuration. In other words, reallocating the existing 543 seats based on demographic changes from 1971 to the next census has been ruled out.

However, the census that should inform post-2026 redistricting is nowhere in sight. Still, many possible options are being discussed in anticipation of the delimitation exercise. These range from the radical—such as a “de novo” reorganisation of states along the lines of republics and principalities of the Mahabharata era—to more moderate proposals like increasing the number of Lok Sabha seats (without any state losing seats), adding seats in Vidhan Sabhas, and expanding the Rajya Sabha without altering the extant distribution among states.

Other suggestions include extending Rajya Sabha jurisdiction to Money Bills, imposing a cap so that no state holds more than 10 per cent of Lok Sabha seats, reorganising the five largest states to create more symmetry, or setting up a second States Reorganisation Commission to evaluate demands for new states—ranging from Poorvanchal to Awadh to Vidarbha to Uttar Andhra and Mithilanchal.

TFR is falling across states

Before going further, a caveat is necessary. Contrary to the perception that India’s population is burgeoning, the national Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is now below the replacement level of 2.1 per cent.

At a panel discussion on scholar Ravi Mishra’s book, Demography, Representation and Delimitation: The North-South Divide in India, it was argued that over time, the current asymmetry in population growth would be balanced by internal migration — from aspirational districts to urban centres where economic growth is faster. Thanks to improved rail and road connectivity, India’s labour market is becoming more integrated, with skilled workers in demand nationwide.

Radical ideas: 75 states?

One of the most radical suggestions comes from Gautam Desiraju, structural chemist and IISc professor who proposes that the delimitation debate be seized as an opportunity for a ‘de novo’ reorganisation of India into seventy-five states — each with a population of two to three crore and similar development, cultural, and linguistic aspirations.

However, unless there is a groundswell of support, pushing for such sweeping changes purely on administrative convenience would be difficult. Desiraju also notes that before the Mughals and the East India Company centralised revenue collection, administration and justice were fairly decentralised across India.

Freeze Lok Sabha seats, expand state legislatures
Another option is to continue the freeze on Lok Sabha seats until 2047, while allowing state legislatures to grow. Within this framework, two possibilities emerge. First, increase Rajya Sabha membership from 250 to about 400 to provide for better debate on federal issues. Second, by 2047, as TFR levels stabilise across all regions, adjusting parliamentary constituencies might become less contentious.

Meanwhile, this period can be used to evolve a more transparent system for resource distribution under the Finance Commission.

Reorganisation of large states

Another suggestion is to reorganise the top five states into smaller, more manageable units. Analysis of the top ten states (by population) shows that in a reconstituted Lok Sabha, Uttar Pradesh’s share would rise from 14.73 per cent to 16.93 per cent, Maharashtra’s from 8.84 per cent to 9.12 per cent, Bihar’s from 7.37 per cent to 9.02 per cent, Madhya Pradesh’s from 5.34 per cent to 6.2 per cent, Rajasthan’s from 4.6 per cent to 5.81 per cent, and Gujarat’s from 4.79 per cent to 5.12 per cent.

Significant losers would include West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh, whose shares would decline. Bihar would see the sharpest rise, while Tamil Nadu would suffer the sharpest fall.

UP’s Assembly, under Mayawati’s second term, had even passed a resolution advocating the creation of four new states: Poorvanchal, Paschim Pradesh, Awadh Pradesh, and Bundelkhand. There are longstanding demands for Vidarbha in Maharashtra, Mithila in Bihar, Vindhyachal in MP, and Mewar in Rajasthan.

A more nuanced option is to establish a second States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) to evaluate such demands based on administrative and financial viability.

The Panikkar formula

An interesting historical suggestion comes from KM Panikkar, a member of the first SRC, who dissented over the disproportionate representation of UP. He cited Bismarck’s Germany, where Prussian dominance was curtailed despite Prussia’s population and economic clout.

In a recent Indian Express article, Sanjay Baru echoed this idea, suggesting a 10% cap on the number of MPs any one state could send to Parliament.

Reimagining the Rajya Sabha

Another proposal gaining attention is to base Rajya Sabha representation on a state’s contribution to central taxes. This would better balance demographic strength with economic contribution.

Closely linked is the idea of reintroducing domiciliary requirements for Rajya Sabha membership—requirements that were relaxed to facilitate Manmohan Singh’s election from Assam, but which allowed party leaderships to override local political sentiments.

Empowering grassroots democracy

Ultimately, the most crucial reform for strengthening Indian democracy lies elsewhere: in empowering local bodies. Panchayats, Zilla Parishads, and municipalities — which interact most closely with citizens — must be given greater financial and administrative autonomy.

Although the 73rd and 74th Amendments (CSTA) recommended the delegation of 29 subjects listed in the Eleventh Schedule to local bodies, most states have resisted genuine devolution. Implementing these reforms in letter and spirit would resolve many day-to-day governance issues.

Bigger House, shorter sessions?

Before concluding, a fundamental question must be asked: What is the point of reorganising the Lok Sabha if parliamentary sessions continue to shrink, significant Bills are pushed through without adequate debate or scrutiny by select committees, and both the ruling party and opposition reduce parliamentary proceedings to predictable “ayes” and “nays”?

If Parliament itself does not function meaningfully, how much does the size of a constituency even matter?

(Sanjeev Chopra is a former IAS officer and Festival Director of Valley of Words. Until recently, he was director, Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration)