RIGHT ANGLE – Will Modi apply the lesson learnt from Korea in Ukraine?
Is India Prime Minister Narendra Modi going to visit Ukraine in the last week of this month?
If he is visiting, is that part of a mission to broker peace between Ukraine and Russia, something India had done quite admirably during the Korean War by bringing about an Armistice Agreement between South Korea supported by the United States and North Korea backed by Communist China and the then Soviet Union?
If India under Modi is really serious about mediating between the two warring nations of Russia and Ukraine, something China and Turkey have also been attempting, does New Delhi have better global credibility and support than Beijing and Ankara for the job?
Let us attempt answering these three questions, one by one.
First, Modi’s scheduled visit to Ukraine has not been officially announced as one writes this. But the very fact that it has been widely reported over the last two days without inviting any denial by the Modi-government means that the news is credible. Apparently, one such report says that the Indian Prime Minister will leave for Ukraine on August 23.
Coming to the second question, since Modi’s date has not been officially announced, it is difficult to say about his exact agenda, something that is usually disclosed by senior foreign ministry officials in select briefings to the press on the eve of the Prime Minister’s foreign trips.
However, what is unmistakable is that Modi’s very visit to Ukraine would go a long way in assuaging Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hurt feelings over his trip to Moscow last month to resume India-Russia summit, an annual feature since 2000 but suspended for two years ( 2022, 2023).
It is true that Ukraine has not liked India’s perceived neutrality on the Russian invasion by not condemning it and New Delhi’s continued diplomatic, political, and economic and defense interactions with Moscow. But it is also a fact that despite the historically strong and time-tested Indo-Russian strategic ties, Modi and his officials, including foreign minister S. Jaishankar , have always pointed out to Russia that war in Ukraine will not end by military might amid bombs, guns and bullets, but through ‘diplomacy and dialogue”.
Russia seems to have appreciated India’s position, but that does not seem to have been the case with Ukraine, though Modi has spoken on this on the telephone to Zelenskyy, apart from conveying this physically at the G7 summits, this year in Italy and last year in Tokyo. India has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Modi was reported to have assured Zelenskyy that India would do “everything it can” to help end the war.
In fact, the joint Statement that was issued at the end of Modi’s visit to Russia last month says that both sides “highlighted the imperative of peaceful resolution of the conflict around Ukraine through dialogue and diplomacy including engagement between both parties. They noted with appreciation relevant proposals of mediation and good offices aimed at peaceful resolution of the conflict in accordance with international law and on the basis of the UN Charter”.
What can India do to end the war? Here its role during the Korean War is instructive.
In some ways, the war in Ukraine has some features that are comparable to the ones in the Korean War. That war commenced in 1950 with the invasion by the northern half of the Korean peninsula controlled by the Communists on the southern half resided by the West-oriented Koreans backed by the United States.
It may be noted that India had led the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to conduct ‘peaceful and highly representative elections’ in 1948 that had resulted in the creation of the first democratically elected government in Korea. But that was in the southern half, today’s South Korea.
Anyway, with China’s subsequent participation in the war in 1951 and Russian help to the North, the war in Korea seemed to be never-ending. The then South Korean President Syngman Rhee was adamant, like Zelenskyy now, that the aggressors must be defeated and that the West must provide all the needed military and economic help.
But the war got bogged down in a frozen stalemate, such as the standoff between American and Chinese forces in 1951 in the mountains along what is now the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
Meanwhile, the continued American support to South Korea became a domestic political issue as it is the case over the limits of American contribution to the war in Ukraine today. Republican attacks on the then U.S. President Harry Truman (Democrat) were so intense that he did not seek another term in office in the 1952 presidential election. Republican Dwight Eisenhower won that election eventually (is this history ominous for Democrats in November elections this year?).
And this was the time during which India, under the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, played a somewhat mediatory role by engaging with all the major stakeholders – the U.S. ( which had entered the war on behalf of the United Nations), China and the then USSR. His proposal for an immediate ceasefire did not bear fruits initially, but it was the Indian resolution that was passed in the United Nations in 1952 on the exchange of prisoners of war(PoW) and it was India that was selected to chair the Neutral Nations Repatriation Committee(NNRC), which successfully held PoWs for 90 days.
And most importantly, it was the success of this NNRC that facilitated the eventual signing of the Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953 between the warring parties and the subsequent establishment of the Korean DMZ. This 1953 Agreement has not “ended” the war technically as of now, but by “suspending” the war, this Agreement has upheld the peace all these years in the Korean peninsula.
A similar initiative can bring a pause to the on-going war in Ukraine; its suspension could subsequently lead to a negotiated settlement acceptable to both Moscow and Kyiv. To begin with, India could make both the parties agree on the humane treatment and exchange of prisoners, safety of nuclear power plants, non-use of cluster bombs and evacuation of the civilians from intense war zones. Mutual confidence generated in the process may lead to a durable ceasefire and the establishment of a demilitarized zone, with Russian and Ukraine forces withdrawing several kilometres from their forward positions. The idea of U.N. mandated peacekeepers to organize a referendum to ascertain the popular will in the disputed territories towards a peaceful settlement of the dispute could then be explored ( this has been suggested by Tesla CEO Elon Musk, which now has many buyers).
Now comes the most important point raised in the third question – credibility of India compared to Turkey and China for playing such a role. And when one is talking of credibility, it is not only a question of acceptance by Russia and Ukraine but also the endorsement of the global community in general and the U.S.-led Western world in particular as that is sustaining the war in Ukraine by its billions of dollars’ worth economic and military assistance to Ukraine.
Turkey, it may be noted , had played an important role in activating the corridor in the Black Sea to transport grain from Ukraine to various world markets as Russia had blocked it following the escalation of its conflict with Ukraine. But of late, it has not shown any similar zeal.
Besides, Turkey’s recent roles in inflaming the delicate situation in the Middle East and exhibiting positions encouraging the cause of radical Islam in many parts of the world are being seen by many as “irresponsible behaviour” on the part of a major power.
On its part, China has recently hosted Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. It has made some proposals (“three principles” of conflict norms, “three elements” of the peace negotiation plan, “three concerns” of humanitarian protection) that have been endorsed by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
But then, China’s readiness as a mediator is not that forthcoming as its latest position is that though Ukraine and Russia “have sent signals of willingness to negotiate to varying degrees”, conditions are “not yet ripe” for peace negotiations.
Moreover, as the Western world strongly believes that China is the biggest “enabler” of Russia in its war against Ukraine and that Beijing is a big flouter of international laws and world order, it playing a mediatory role does not generate that much confidence for them.
On the other hand, India has reasons to be taken seriously by both Russia and the U.S.-led West. Modi seems to have Putin’s support. America may have not liked India’s “strategic autonomy” and its continuing links with Russia, but the fact remains that it is India which is “the swing-power” in its real rivalry with China, Washington’s principal geopolitical adversary in the world.
For the West, it is India that can deliver a large geopolitical payoff because both share the same approach to the international order that is more fluid and open than that of China or Russia. It is India that has invariably behaved as a responsible power. It is India that respects territorial sovereignty for all nations and advocates for rule-based governance and ‘security and growth for all’.
In sum, India is in a favourable position to stake out a mediatory role in Ukraine and remind the world that it is a responsible global player. But whether Modi is prepared to play that role remains to be seen.