No Separate Domicile For States ; State Reorganization Cannot Take Away Fundamental Right Of Indian Citizens To Reside And Settle In Any Part Of Country

by Sep 19, 2022Blogs0 comments

While making no bones about the unfettered right of each and every citizen of India to settle wherever one wants to settle in any part of the nation, the Apex Court as recently as on September 14, 2022 in a most learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled The State of Telangana & Anr vs B Subba Rayudu and others in Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 1565-66 of 2021 and cited in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 767 in exercise of its civil appellate jurisdiction has minced absolutely just no words to make it indubitably clear that there is only one domicile i.e. domicile of the country and there is no separate domicile for a State. The Bench of Apex Court comprising of Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice V Ramasubramanian observed that State Reorganization Act or any guidelines framed thereunder cannot take away from citizens, the right to reside and settle in any part of the country. The Bench also clearly stated that, “When a State is divided and the employees and officers of the State Government have to be allotted to the two states, such allocation has to be done on the basis of the Rules and Regulations and by guidelines. However they have to be construed harmoniously with the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India.”

It must be stated that B Subba Rayadu held the State Cadre post of Joint Director Class A in the Animal Husbandry Department of the undivided State of Andhra Pradesh. Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 bifurcated the State of Andhra Pradesh into two States – the new State of Telangana and the residue state of Andhra Pradesh with effect from June 2, 2014. Rayudu had opted for allocation to the State of Telangana. However, he was allotted the State of Andhra Pradesh against which he made a representation that he be considered a local candidate of the State of Telangana. Later, the High Court for the State of Telangana and for the State of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad allowed the Writ Petitions filed by him. The State then challenging this approached the Apex Court.

At the outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Justice Indira Banerjee for a Bench of Apex Court comprising of herself and Justice V Ramasubramanian first and foremost puts forth in para 1 that, “These Special Leave Petitions are against a final judgment and order dated 8th December 2020 whereby the High Court for the State of Telangana and for the State of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, allowed the Writ Petitions filed by the Respondent No.1 being Writ Petition (TR.) No. 5482 of 2017 and Writ Petition No. 24820 of 2017, set aside an order being F. No. 29/01/2016-SR(S) dated 14th January 2016 of the Ministry of Personnel, PG and Pensions and directed the Ministry of Personnel, PG and Pensions to allocate the Respondent to the State of Telangana with effect from 14th January 2016. The State of Telangana was directed to give a posting to the Respondent in the cadre of Joint Director-Class A in the Animal Husbandry Department of the State of Telangana and also pay salary to the Respondent as Joint Director-Class A in the Animal Husbandry Department within four weeks from the date of the judgment and order.”

It is then stated in para 2 that, “The Respondent No.1, a member of a Scheduled Tribe, held the State Cadre post of Joint Director-Class A in the Animal Husbandry Department of the undivided State of Andhra Pradesh. Smt. B. Shanthabai, wife of the Respondent No.1, was also a State Government employee working as Assistant Registrar in the same State.”

It would be instructive to note that the Bench then mentions in para 3 that, “By a Notification No.S.O.655B dated 4th March 2014, the Central Government notified the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 bifurcating the State of Andhra Pradesh into two States- the new State of Telangana and the residue state of Andhra Pradesh with effect from 2nd June 2014.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 8 that, “On 7th March 2015, the Respondent opted for allocation to the State of Telangana. At the material point of time, the Respondent was working as Project Director, ATMA, Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad on deputation. However, by a Notification No. 21105-B/SRI/AI/2014-4 dated 12th June 2015, the Respondent was allotted to the State of Andhra Pradesh tentatively. The Respondent submitted his objection against his tentative allocation to the State of Andhra Pradesh on 26th June 2015, pursuant to the proceedings being GAD(SR), Department, Notification No. 21105/B/SRI/2014-4.”

Further, the Bench then states in para 9 that, “On 26th June 2015, the Respondent made a representation that he be considered a local candidate of the State of Telangana. The representation was not considered. By an order No. 5(2)/2016 dated 14th January 2016 in the proceedings being F. No. 29/01/2016, the Ministry of Personnel, PG and Pensions of the Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India, allotted the Respondent to the State of Andhra Pradesh.”

It is then disclosed by the Bench in para 10 that, “The Respondent filed an application being O.A No.209/2016 before the Central Administrative Tribunal at Andhra Pradesh, challenging the aforesaid allocation order dated 14th January 2016 issued by the Government of India. On 29th January 2016, the Administrative Tribunal issued notice in the application and passed an interim order to the effect that the final allocation of the Respondent to the State of Andhra Pradesh would be subject to the final result of the Original Application.”

Furthermore, the Bench then points out in para 11 that, “By an order 4th February 2016, the Animal Husbandry, Dairy Development and Fisheries Department of the Government of Telangana relieved the Respondent. By an order dated 5th February 2016, the Government of Telangana, Department of Animal Husbandry, directed the Respondent No.1 to report to the Head of the Department, Andhra Pradesh for further posting.”

As an inevitable fallout, the Bench then lays bare in para 12 that, “The Respondent filed a Writ Petition being Writ Petition No. 4391 of 2016 in the High Court challenging the interim order dated 29th January 2016 passed by the Administrative Tribunal. By an order dated 16th February 2016, the High Court allowed the Writ Petition No. 4391 of 2016 and remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration and directed the Tribunal to pass a speaking order, after hearing both the parties, within two weeks. It was also directed that the Respondent No.1 should not be relieved from his present place of posting till disposal of the Interlocutory Application.”

As we see, the Bench then enunciates in para 17 that, “By the impugned judgment and order dated 18th February 2017, the High Court allowed both the Writ Petitions, setting aside the proceedings being F. No. 29/01/2016-SR(S) dated 14th January 2016 (Final Allocation Order) of the Ministry of Personnel, PG and Pensions, insofar as it concerned the Respondent No.1.”

As things stand, the Bench then specifies in para 18 that, “The Ministry was directed to allocate the Respondent No.1 to the State of Telangana with effect from 14th January 2016 and the State of Telangana was directed to forthwith give posting to the Respondent in the cadre of Joint Director, Class-A in the Animal Husbandry Department of the State of Telangana and also to release his salary within four weeks.”

Of course, the Bench then hastened to add in para 53 that, “The Union of India contended that the request of the Respondent No.1 for allocation to Telangana on the ground of his spouse being a local of Telangana could also not be accepted as his spouse belonged to the zonal cadre of Andhra Pradesh.”

Most appropriately, the Bench then lays down aptly in para 55 stating that, “There is no infirmity in the well reasoned order of the High Court which calls for interference of this Court in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. As argued by Ms. Mohana, jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is discretionary. The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India should not ordinarily be exercised to interfere with an otherwise just and reasonable order by recourse to hyper technicality upon a narrow, rigid and pedantic interpretation of the guidelines.”

Going ahead, the Bench then states in para 56 that, “Admittedly, at the time of bifurcation of the State of Andhra Pradesh, the Petitioner was posted in an area which falls with Telangana. The Petitioner was required to exercise an option, which he admittedly did. It is not in dispute that 9 posts out of total 23 posts were allocated to the State of Telangana and 14 to the State of Andhra Pradesh. As per guidelines, allocable employees were to be considered on the basis of seniority as on 1st June 2014.”

It is worth noting that the Bench then points out in para 57 that, “As found by the High Court, the Petitioner’s position was 4th in seniority in the composite State of Andhra Pradesh as on 1st June 2014. The 3 people, senior to him, were all local candidate of Andhra Pradesh, who had opted for Andhra Pradesh. The Respondent No.1 was senior most of the employees who opted for Telangana. The High Court found that the Respondent No.1 had denied allocation to Telangana on a “strange interpretation of Clause (f) of paragraph 18 of the Guidelines, giving no weight to seniority. The High Court found on facts that no importance at all had been given to the fact that the spouse of the Respondent No.1 was a local of Telangana.”

It cannot be glossed over that the Bench then makes it a point to mention in para 58 that, “On a possible interpretation of the Guidelines read with the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment Order 1975 and, in particular, paragraph 4 thereof, the High Court found that the Respondent No.1 was local candidate of the State of Telangana. Admittedly, he studied from Class VIII to X at Khammam which is in the State of Telangana. He thereafter did his Bachelor of Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandry and Master of Veterinary Science at the college of Veterinary Science, AP, Agricultural University at Hyderabad. He studied in that institution for 7 years from 1985 to 1992 being the year in which he appeared in the qualifying examination.”

Most brilliantly and most commendably, the Bench then minces no words to hold in simple, suave and straightforward language in para 59 what forms the cornerstone of this learned judgment that, “Under the Constitution, India is a Union of States. Every part of every State is an integral and inseverable part of India. Admittedly, the Respondent was born in India. He has his domicile in the territory of India. As held by this Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 1420, under the Indian Constitution, there is only one domicile i.e. domicile of the country and there is no separate domicile for a State.”

Most notably, the Bench then makes it indubitably clear in para 63 holding that, “It is not in dispute that the respondent has his domicile in the Territory of India and was born in the territory of India. Admittedly, he is a citizen of this country. As a citizen of India, the respondent has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India.”

Most remarkably, it cannot be lost sight of that the Bench then makes it clear in para 64 that, “Under Article 13 (2) of the Constitution of India prohibits the State from making any law which takes away or infringes the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution of India and any law made in contravention of Article 13(2), to the extent of the contravention would be void.”

For sake of clarity, the Bench then clarifies in para 65 that, “All statutes and all rules, regulations and bye-laws framed by the Government, which constitute law have to be construed harmoniously with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of India.”

Most forthrightly, the Bench then also states upfront in para 66 that, “The Andhra Pradesh State Reorganisation Act, 2014 or any other guidelines framed thereunder, including the guidelines circulated on 30.10.2014 cannot take away from citizens, the right to reside and settle in any part of the country.”

Frankly speaking, the Bench then concedes in para 67 that, “It is true that when a State is divided and the employees and officers of the State Government have to be allotted to the two states, such allocation has to be done on the basis of the Rules and Regulations and by guidelines.”

Having said so, the Bench then clarifies in para 68 that, “However, such rules, regulations and guidelines have to be construed harmoniously with the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. It is true that the respondent may have been born in an area which now forms part of Andhra Pradesh and may have received a substantial part of his education in areas which now form part of the State of Andhra Pradesh. However, admittedly, he cleared all Board and University examinations from areas within the State of Telangana. At the time of bifurcation, he was posted in Hyderabad, which is now part of Telangana.”

Broadly speaking, the Bench then clearly states in para 69 that, “The guidelines circulated on 30.10.2014 for allocation of employees and officers to the States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh are directory and not inflexible. On a liberal interpretation of the guidelines in the light of the philosophy of the Indian Constitution read with Andhra Pradesh Public Employment Order, 1975, which was in force at the time of bifurcation, and is applicable to the respondent even under the Guidelines referred to above, the High Court rightly arrived at the conclusion that the respondent was a local candidate of Telangana and was entitled to allocation as per his seniority in terms of Paragraph 18(f) of the guidelines. Furthermore, admittedly, the spouse of the respondent was a local candidate of Telangana.”

It is a no-brainer that the Bench then holds in para 70 that, “In our considered view, there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court affirming the judgment of the Single Bench.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 71 that, “The Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.”

In conclusion, the Apex Court has most brilliantly done a yeoman’s job in knocking off the false notion that for States there is a separate domicile and cited the landmark case of Dr Pradeep Jain (supra) in this regard as stated hereinabove. It also made it crystal clear that the State Reorganization cannot take away the fundamental right of the Indian citizens to reside and settle in any part of the country. This is also another most laudable part of this noteworthy judgment! No denying it!

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